The Twilight War, later known as as the Phoney War and Drôle de guerre (Funny War / Strange War) in France, was the period following the British Revolution in which the military and security services maintained a heightened state of alert due to an ongoing period of Loyalist insurgency. In earlier stages this was compounded by fears of an imminent counter-invasion by the Imperial remnants or a hypothetical intervention by the German Empire. While the Twilight War saw no large-scale military combat, the army remained partially mobilised and fears among the public were so high that it necessitated the creation of the Home Guard to allow for decentralised and local defence. Despite its creation amid the crisis, the Home Guard never saw extensive action during it.
Despite the concerns of the public and hypothetical military defence plans, the anticipated counter-invasion never took place and continental tensions were defused by the foreign office. All military actions took place between the British Army and decentralised Loyalist insurgents, primarily united by the Loyalist League in the early period of the conflict. After a period of three years, the Twilight War was formally 'concluded' in the Autumn 1930, when the Ministry of War opted to stand the army and passed a memorandum that declared the potentiality of a Canadian invasion was effectively null. Nevertheless, Loyalist insurgents operate to the present day and there is debate over the true ending.
Terminology[]
Initially the period was often referred to as the 'White Terror' or Bandit Crisis by contemporary commentators reflecting the early nature of the conflict. The term Red Terror was also adopted but later used to exclusively describe the socialist reaction to the crisis and prior outbursts of popular anger during the civil war. The 'Bandit War' became the favoured term among the British public and press, in reference to the more criminal nature of the conflict and was often used to beat the fledgling Home Office and J.R. Clynes for a lack of progress on the domestic security front. In France, the satirical newsletter, Le Canard enchaîné coined the term Drôle de guerre (Funny War / Strange War) in repeat satires of the strange nature of the conflict and seemingly comical ineffectiveness of the British security apparatus. The term later became common lexicon in France when discussing the conflict.
The term Twilight War did not emerge until the summer months of 1926 when Chief of the General Staff, Ronald Forbes Adam, began referring to it as the 'Twilight War'. This quickly became the de facto official lexicon among the army and War Office with it also quickly spreading into usage among the public. As 'banditry' and general criminality largely ceased - to be replaced with more politically motivated insurgents - the term Twilight War became more apt in describing the insurgency and was now generally treated as a 'continuation' of the civil war rather than a separate security affair in its own right. Though the threat of a Canadian invasion had waned by the end of 1926 and only declined thereafter, the Loyalist campaign of terror remained an enduring fear in the public consciousness.
Eventually the Americanism of Phoney War entered limited usage as the official term used in America and the Imperial remnants. It saw only limited usage in Britain where the 'Twilight War' has remained dominant. There is no conclusive provenance for the term but an oft-cited example is that of a Wisconsite newspaper, the Capital Times, published a small bulletin on 'Phantom Armies and England's Phony War' in the September of 1928. Nevertheless, many newspapers used the British spelling of 'Phoney' even in North America, rather than the American spelling though in Canada (and later Britain) the British spelling was regarded as the only acceptable term. It has been speculated that US Senator William Borah probably coined the term, as during a speech urging for the pursuing of trade relations with Britain he argued against the notion the Union was still in a state of civil strife in declaring 'there's something phoney about this alleged war'.
Background[]
Following the collapse of the Loyalist front in December of 1925 and the evacuation of the government from Great Britain, the war Civil War had officially ceased. Despite the formal end of hostilities and plans for the army to demobilise, not all of those loyal to the King's government surrendered or disarmed. Earlier in 1925, the Secretary of State for War, F. E. Smith, had been involved in a plan on the urging of the War Office to establish 'Auxiliary Patrols' to counter an incoming rebel advance and sow chaos behind enemy lines. Soldiers, intelligence operatives and members of the pre-existing but separate Auxiliaries were covertly transported past the frontlines and conducted terror operations against the local populace and rebel bases. Life expectancy among the recruits was short and the Smith regarded the programme as a failure. Nevertheless, while hopes of massive sabotage fell through, it did manage to inflict a degree of psychological terror against the civilian populace and cause resources to be directed to securing the home front against further terror attacks.
Learning from this experience, Smith's friend, Winston Churchill, proposed that the War Office instead repurpose the Auxiliary Patrol program into top secret 'stay-behind' networks. The intention was that these units would fight in as irregular skirmishers in the initial onslaught before all local units would disappear into their operational bases and maintain no contact with regular unit commanders, who were to be wholly unaware of their existence. However, the exact function of the Auxiliaries was still being debated at the War Office. Some civil servants, and Churchill especially, held a 'romantic view' of their purpose and how they would conduct themselves. This held that the Auxiliaries would be a fully fledged 'resistance organisation' that would stay behind in areas under a long-term occupation by conducting sabotage and reconnaissance. This clashed with Smith's own idea of the Auxiliaries, who he felt would be volunteering for immensely dangerous work and have a life expectancy of 'some two weeks at most'. Smith and his own plans anticipated that the Auxiliaries would inflict immense and major damage over a brief but violent period to wound and demoralise the rebels before a fully-fledged counter-assault could take out the now weakened enemy.
Among the Auxiliaries themselves there was immense confusion over their exact roles due to poor planning and rushed training. Many of them received only around three to four weeks of training before being assigned a 'patch' - usually a small area of countryside outside a major town or village. The men would then have to choose an area to make their base, with assistance from the Royal Engineers if possible; off their own backs if not. Bases were usually small and basic tunnels with the basic necessities but towards the last days of the conflict some had constructed elaborate hideouts with the aid of military engineers. However, to account for the hastened preparation, the Auxiliaries initially recruited only from local outdoorsman: gamekeepers, farmers, hunters, groundskeepers and other men who would be in a prime position to know the lay of the land and the areas they would be assaulting. Recruits were told to either commit suicide or kill each other if capture or discovery seemed likely. During the civil war it is believed that only two were ever 'activated' as Smith had planned - all others remained dormant until after the conflict had concluded. The secrecy surrounding the insurgent units meant that, according to the War Office, members 'had no military status, no uniforms and there are very few official records of their activities'. To this day, little real information survives on the Units and their history is surrounded in speculation and what artefacts have been recovered.
The Twilight War[]
The Bandit Crisis[]
The initial period of 1926 was marked by the so-called 'Bandit War' as it was termed by the public and press though this was often simply called the 'Emergency' by the government. During the civil war, law and order had broken down in much of Britain and a continued absence of civil authority left a vacuum behind that the Provisional Government had yet to fill. Policing had been conducted by the military and militias in the interim but the militias were now being disbanded and disarmed. Likewise, the military was in a process of demobilisation and reorientating to protection from a hypothetical Canadian counter-invasion leaving much of the countryside to fend for itself. The threat of an invasion was a real possibility with leaked and captured reports indicating that at least three divisions were being mobilised across the Atlantic for an intervention so long as beachheads could be maintained. While the ports had been closed, the Ministry of War still speculated that the remnant Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy may try to break the siege and launch assault in the West of the country. Troops that were not demobilised or under going reorganisation were redeployed to areas of strategic interest and where fighting may occur.
Elsewhere, areas of the country remained in physical ruin and the presence of refugees put a major economic strain on the resources of affected areas. Enterprising criminals, desperate refugees and undisciplined soldiers of loyalist forces that had now been cut loose turned to banditry to either make ends meet or continue some form of personal resistance against the new regime. Rural areas became a hotbed for this sort of criminality, often taking the form of violent coercion and extortion of food, money and supplies but in some cases involved murder and assault. Provisional authorities in Lincolnshire reported some 12 unsolved murders of farmers and other families in the rural areas of the county. Some citizens in these underpoliced areas took to arming themselves in an attempt to keep intruders at bay, others fled to the safety of the towns and cities, putting a further strain on limited resources. Initially, the press began to refer to these incidents as examples of 'bandits' roaming Britain and other incidents of 'petty criminality' while laying the blame at the Home Office. The Home Secretary, J.R. Clynes, defended his record by pointing to the swift actions he had taken in restoring policing services within the towns and villages and it is reported that he had briefly considered establishing a gendarmerie to help with policing in remote rural districts. Though a gendarme was shelved, the crisis did influence Clyne's decision to establish the National Investigation Bureau as a federal and special law enforcement division. The degree to how much of this early violence was politically motivated has been heavily overlooked and contemporarily was mostly absent in the early period of 1926. Clynes and his colleagues did not believe there was a serious ideological threat posed and John Wheatley's intelligence report in the April of 1926 stipulated that the perpetrators 'did not pose a real threat; are mostly petty criminals; largely economically motivated'.
Academics have debated when the 'Bandit' period of the Twilight War came to a conclusion due to poor record keeping in the time period and a lack of distinction between genuine insurgents and mere criminals. Nevertheless, some citizens took measures to protect themselves and groups banded together to form 'Watch Committees' and other 'Volunteer Guardsmen' societies, among other names, to protect themselves in rural areas. As the Home Office began to re-establish rural policing towards the Summer months of the year, criminal incidents of among other things: theft, robbery, assault, burglary, extortion and aggravated trespass began to decline sharply decline. Some have contended that the police handling of 'petty criminals' that were indeed opportunistic bandits shuttered this sort of criminality fairly early on but others have contended that the issue of banditry remained well until the end of the year when the Home Office had re-established authority in earnest.
Insurgency in the Open[]
While there was an overarching fear of loyalist sentiment within the civil and public consciousness, this was largely regarded as more clandestine and subversive activities done my Canadian backed spies or ideological sympathies held by crypto-royalists. The concept of a large-scale paramilitary force that could continue to wage guerrilla war against the new nation was still not thought of as feasible and common belief held that underground subversives such as the Loyalist League's newsletter, English Patriot, were their main means of undermining the new republic. While the government was aware of the League's existence from as early as February of 1926, it severely underestimated its capabilities and Wheatley initially believed that it was composed of 'middle-class loyalists and militia remnants.' While the fledgling intelligence services were aware of some 'incidents of Loyalist violence' this was regarded as the remnants of Loyalist militias rather than a genuinely serious threat.
However, the Loyalists would finally come to major government attention on the 10th June, 1926, with the Battle of Marden, in Kent. Just outside the village, the republican military had established an internment camp where refugee accommodations had been erected. An ad hoc military barracks had also been established for a small army garrison and it was common for soldiers to travel to the town. On the evening of the 10th, some soldiers had headed to the town and reportedly “five or six men” approached the western side of the military camp and attempted to dismantle the walls. A private spotted them but was shot dead just after he had raised the alarm. In the ensuing attack, at least of the attackers were killed and one was wounded. All others were able to escape into nearby fields and woodland, with their wounded comrade attempting the same but being unable to keep pace. After having interrogated their prisoner, troops were able to ascertain that a 'covert military base' was in the vicinity and sought to neutralise it before a counter-attack could be mounted. After a brief period of searching, the soldiers were able to locate the bunker some four miles from the town near an abandoned farm. After a brief shootout, the rest of the paramilitaries were neutralised and the bunker was raided with various Loyalist paraphernalia and equipment recovered. The area was quickly declared an incident zone and military intelligence took over proceedings to establish a report on the events and take custody of the sole surviving paramilitary, referred to as "Clifford".
While the War Office attempted to conceal the incident, gossip spread among the army base and spread to the nearby town with rumours of a 'secret Royalist resistance' having made its home just outside the town. A panic quickly ensued and reportedly a 'vigilante posse' was formed by terrified residents though to what degree the event has been exaggerated is debated. The Ministry of Information enforced a media blackout on discussion of the events, with the so-called 'Battle of Marden' being largely confined to army gossip circles and petty rumours. At an emergency government meeting to discuss the incident, it was proposed that the town be evacuated immediately and the area be put under martial law in case other paramilitary units were in operation. This proposal was jointly vetoed by both Deputy Chair John Wheatley and Home Secretary J.R. Clynes on the basis that it would draw too much attention to the event and spread panic. Clynes further noted that to "assume these Loyalists are operating solely in the area of Marden or even just Kent would be foolish. For all we know they could have pitched their tents and dug their foxholes across the whole of the South." While Clynes was chastised by Cook and Henderson for 'fear-mongering' he would be unwittingly correct. Wheatley was in agreement that, regardless of whether there were more, a specialised division of military intelligence had to be established to combat the Loyalist threat. This would lead to the creation of the Special Operations Executive as a specialist division of the military charged with ensuring ideological cohesivity and counter-terrorism. Now in the custody of the SOE, "Clifford" (his identity was never revealed for anonymity purposes) admitted under interrogation that he had been recruited from the military during the civil war to serve as part of a "elite unit of underground specialists charged with the destruction and sabotage of any occupying forces". He would later testify in a military tribunal that there existed "probably hundreds of Loyalist cells" spread out across the South of the country and that the Loyalist League was "deeply connected to but not necessarily always involved with" the aforementioned cells. Equipment and other evidence recovered from the bunker corroborated his testimonials and finally established both a militarised loyalist presence and a connection between the insurgents and the proscribed Loyalist League, which at this point had only been regarded as a political organisation without the capacity for paramilitary efforts.
While the Ministry of Information was successful in suppressing news of the attack in Kent, it was approximately a month later with the first high-profile political assassination that sparked a major panic. On the 9th of July, the Bothwell-based politician, John Robertson was assassinated - and an attendant wounded - by a gunman just outside the town of Dornoch. Robertson had taken a holiday in the town to convalesce after recent health troubles and was a somewhat well known politician owing to his involvement in the TUC's powerful mining lobby. While his murder was initially investigated by the regional police division, the case was quickly taken over by domestic intelligence who had already suspected that a contingent of "loyalist soldiers" that had been unable to evacuate from Scotland had remained to some degree. This now confirmed their suspicions and an intercepted newsletter of 'English Patriot' implied Loyalist involvement in the assassination. While the Ministry of Information attempts to control the narrative, a flood of media attention soon followed - particularly after Robertson's successor, Joseph Sullivan, publicly declared that he would not stand down in the face of the Loyalist terrorists that had killed his predecessor. The blatant assassination of a sitting Congressman sparked widespread outrage and panic across the nation. In a special radio address, Clynes called for calm but did indeed finally confirm for the first time that an "insurgency of Loyalist forces is operating within Great Britain".
In a joint security meeting taking place on the 11th of July, the High Command outlined the belief that the hypothesised Canadian invasion was "increasingly imminent" and cited the recent outburst of Loyalist terror as its reasoning. Until this period, how an invasion would take place was vaguely defined with it being proposed that Ireland would be coerced into being used as a staging ground - potentially in exchange for recognised annexation Ulster - or that Loyalist forces that remained in the North of Scotland may attempt to establish a beachhead in the remote Highlands. The latter example was now considered not just more probable but effectively in progress with the threat having been expanded from rural Scotland to the Southeast as well. The Minister for War, Christopher Thomson, addressed the meeting as follows:
“ | Who were once regarded as petty criminals have now proven themselves as efficient and militarised operators seeking to wage war on Great Britain and its people. We now have compelling evidence that these incidences of terrorism are the prelude to an Imperial counter-invasion wherein Loyalists and counter-revolutionaries will seek to establish safe harbour for their Canadian compatriots in anticipation of an invasion of Great Britain and the ousting of the republic. With the information before us we speculate that an invasion by the Canadian military is no longer a question of if, but when. | ” |
Following Thomson's change in attitude, the War Office began preparing for what it felt was an imminent invasion to begin at some point during the year. Thomson theorised that any invasion would be likely to take place in the Autumn following a 'Black Summer' of Loyalist terrorism and sabotage but before a cold winter so as to ensure the lines remain frozen and allow the invaders to consolidate. When discussing the events, Chief of the General Staff Ronald Forbes Adam, referred to it as the 'Twilight War' commenting that this was the "dawn before the day" but the term 'Continuation War' was also used briefly. The British Army, which was still undergoing a military reorganisation and re-armament, was placed on high alert and military exercises began to take place in anticipation of repelling an assault. The press was quick to report on the the military build-up though the army rarely commented on the matter and the government attempted to dispel reasons to be concerned. Nevertheless, a public panic ensued and concerned citizens began arming themselves in anticipation of fighting off an invasion. This was not an entirely new phenomena as citizens in rural and under-policed areas had been forming impromptu militias to combat bandits, criminals and other ne'er-do-wells. In urban areas, workers did the same in forming patrols and sentry groups for the purposes of protecting their workplaces and neighborhoods from sabotage and attack. These 'Volunteer Legions' now began to take on a different role of pledging themselves for the protection of Britain from the imminent invasion and an unlikely, but hypothetical, German intervention. The government was now faced with a new problem in the growing presence of undisciplined and poorly armed private armies operating outside of its control and inflicting vigilante justice. While nominally 'apolitical' many participated in the Red Terror and associated reprisals.
Climate of Fear[]
The Summer of 1926 was now marked by the twin terrors of Loyalist terrorism and Canadian invasion. A resurgent wartime atmosphere returned to the nation as the government contemplated whether to reintroduce wartime restrictions on public life in an attempt to stem the crisis. This was deeply opposed by Chairman Cook, Deputy Chair Wheatley and Home Secretary Clynes, who all felt uncomfortable with such proposals and wished to keep the situation as a solely 'specialist operation'. Nevertheless, the proposals were partly leaked leading to public concern of a renewed conflict and such concerns influenced George Lansbury's decision to resign from the Presidency. Nevertheless, the government did take the stance of encouraging public self-censorship and heightened awareness for fear that Loyalist saboteurs or Canadian spies could be listening. This stoked Lansbury's antipathy to the incumbent government, who felt that the government was "peddling a climate of fear" to further an anti-pacifist and militarist agenda. Lansbury himself felt that the military threat was overblown and that by giving in to "rampant paranoia", the Union would descend into authoritarianism and dictatorship. Lansbury was harshly criticised by more hawkish elements of the Labour Party for his "wide-eyed naivety" but he refused to concede and claimed that it would be impossible for Canada to launch an invasion.
Meanwhile, Loyalist saboteurs and terrorists became bolder over the Summer and began to escalate the campaign of terror in the countryside. Rural communities were hit by a renewed phase of extortionate coercion with Loyalist operatives using violence and intimidation to gain supplies. A Home Office report highlighted the following areas as hotbeds for the largest degree of activity: the Scottish Highlands, the Southeast of England, Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire and the Welsh Valleys. The degree of activity did not necessarily indicate a region's propensity towards conservatism or Loyalism but rather their geographic nature. Isolated rural areas, extensive uplands and remote villages were favoured by Loyalists as they could conceal themselves in expanses of farmland and woodland; take shelter in the countryside and intimidate isolated residents into cooperation or handing over much needed supplies. The SOE in turn stepped up its operations and began a new crackdown on the insurgents, focusing operations on the Southeast which was regarded as the 'core' Loyalist stronghold. Likewise, the SOE began cooperating closely with the General Intelligence Office - the successor to Mi6 - on investigating Loyalist links with Canada.
As the year wore on, progress was made in gradually combating the Loyalist threat with various bunkers across the South of England having been discovered and dismantled. Though no major incidents made the headlines, the threat nevertheless continued across the country as extortionate violence still occurred and many civilians still taking the matter of protecting their communities into their own hands. Clynes felt the regional divisions of the police force contributed to the problem and sought to establish a single, national-level policing agency that would focus on counter-terror and other trans-regional criminal activities. Wheatley supported the proposals after some consideration and on the 31st of October announced the formation of the National Investigation Bureau. Partially formed out of the provisional Internal Security Service (the defanged and de facto successor to Mi5), the NIB reported directly to the Home Office and would assume functions as of November 1st. Clynes had initially referred to the organisation as the 'Nippers' as he intended for them to "nip criminality in the bud" but due to their initial lack of results, the press dubbed them the 'Fibbers' for allegedly inflating their success records. Despite the tepid response, the NIB formed an instrumental role in the crackdown against Loyalists and policing the countryside; soon became an important part of the British policing apparatus. The rump ISS was placed at Wheatley's disposal and de facto merged into the SOE in the middle of November. Opponents to the government accused it of forming a police state, Wheatley contended this was necessary for national security.
However, in December, amid a harsh winter, the Loyalists returned to the public consciousness in force when they made their first claimed attack on an urban area. The Northern industrial city of Manchester formed a part of the syndicalist heartland and had so far only experienced incidents of banditry and other general criminality during the earlier period of 1926 after the initial war. But on the 20th December, a laundry van exploded on Nell Lane killing six people and wounding twelve others. The city entered a period of outrage and suspected Loyalists were harassed as the government scrambled to handle the affair. The SOE was more formally used to handling matters in rural areas and hunting down rogue soldiers as opposed to conducting an urban investigation. The NIB was given jurisdiction over the matter, in coordination with the Manchester Police and after two weeks, two men were arrested at a cottage in the hamlet of Chunal, just outside of Glossop, Derbyshire. Initially giving their names as 'Stewart' and 'Little', they were later tried at a military tribunal under the names "Wilson" and "Yartlett" and identified themselves as sailors who had deserted from the Royal Navy to sign on as soldiers in one of the many unregulated Loyalist militias the government had given support to. According to their testimony, when the government evacuated they initially turned to banditry out of adventurism but were later recruited to act as 'foot-soldiers' for the Loyalist insurgency by a British spy operating from abroad. Wilson claimed that a third man, the bomb-maker, had provided them with explosives and instructions but had since moved on elsewhere to assist other units. Yartlett corroborated earlier accounts that there were "hundreds of Loyalist units" and that they were becoming more flexible in their area of operations and activities. He later claimed that the Loyalist League had plans to re-ignite the civil war and establish a rival government in the South, as the precursor to a Canadian intervention, though the authenticity of this is debated.
Both men were given death sentences but then informed this would be commuted if they agreed to turn state evidence on their comrades. Yartlett claimed they were "only minor privates" and had no information on their superiors or colleagues, who's identities were kept secret. However, Wilson disproved this by taking the deal and providing information on nearby cells operating in the Northwest as well as two names of interest: "Bill Negle" and Hugh Pollard. Nagle was considered either a pseudonym or dud name as no man could be found but appropriated records indicated that Pollard was an intelligence officer with the British Army who had served in the Great War, Ireland and the Civil War. According to Wilson's testimony, Pollard was a 'spymaster' for the Loyalists but he could not confirm whether he was in Britain or acting abroad. He at the very least acted as a high ranking member of the insurgency and as a link between the Loyalists and Anglo-Canadian intelligence based out of Ottawa leading to renewed fears of foreign involvement. Following the tribunal, Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment and Yartlett was hanged in the spring. Their real identities have never been released.
Decline & Resurgence[]
The winter of 1926 proved harsh for the fledgling Loyalists who were now under immense pressure. The SOE had systematically dismantled their operations in the Southeast, either neutralising their members or forcing them to seek refuge elsewhere in the country, and rural policing had gradually improved. Both the NIB and SOE had gradually curbed excessive violence in the countryside and vigilante militias were now actively fighting back against extortionists. Until this point, the insurgents have survived from a mixture of extorting money and good from rural communities; receiving supplies and 'gifts' from crypto-Royalist sympathisers and occasional shipments of smuggled supplies and equipment provided by the War Office-in-Exile. But going forward into 1927, all three of these supply lines were beginning to falter. Systematic extortion was now an increasingly dangerous means of procuring a relatively small amount of supplies and crypto-Royalist sympathisers were being actively terrorised into submission. Smuggling from mainland Europe and Canada proved the only stable means of securing funds and supplies but even these would wax and wane in activity with supplies never being certain. Many of the insurgents were forced to scale down the operations and wait for the Spring thaw before continuing with Ottawa closely watching the situation and deciding its next move.
The hoped collapse of the republic had failed to materialise and many of the Loyalists were growing fearful of the increasingly efficient republican security apparatus. The military had become experienced in handling Loyalists, with even the RAF being used for reconnaissance and the Navy for seizing illicit contraband. Both the NIB and SOE had become efficient at cracking the insurgents and the security services scored a major victory in the early months of the year when the Loyalist League was all but destroyed as an organised force. After a successive campaign of repression, the League was effectively scattered by the end of Winter and wound up at some point in Spring - though it had ceased to be active by then. The lack of a cohesive organising body served to damage and strengthen the Loyalists. Though the decentralisation aided in their evasion of the authorities, the damage caused by severing the one unifying link caused factionalism to rise among the Loyalists and ruined any attempts at large-scale cooperation for the foreseeable future. Many went on to affiliate to the ephemeral Legion of St. George but others opted to remain independent. As overt attacks calmed, the Loyalist newsletter, English Patriot, remained in heavy circulation despite attempts to shut it down. Having taken note of the situation, Smith and the Minister for the Co-Ordination of Defence - Lord Stanley, Earl of the Derby - opted to push the Loyalists firmly towards preparing for a long-term campaign of preparation, reconnaissance and terror. Loyalist momentum had been lost on both sides of the Atlantic and the Government-in-Exile began to focus on a more long-term strategy of sabotage and subterfuge.
This early period marked a decline for the Loyalists. As their operations were wound down, members of the insurgency began to look towards internal consolidation. The Spring thaw came and went relatively quietly, giving the Cook Ministry a period of peace. Already early in the year, counter-terror operations had been scaled down dramatically amid this quiet with the NIB largely taking over all operations. There was now no need for a paramilitary force akin to the SOE and it was formally abolished on the 28th February, 1927 and then reorganised the following day on the 1st March into the new Central Intelligence Committee: the merger of the SOE and rump ISS into a single counter-intelligence and domestic security agency. Wheatley was named Chair of the Committee, giving him the power to appoint a Director to handle agency affairs. The CIC inherited the same personnel and roles as the old SOE albeit purely as an intelligence agency rather than a paramilitary force. The new CIC focused its efforts largely on countering Canadian intelligence and involvement though Wheatley and the army still believed an invasion was either imminent or in preparation.
The lingering atmosphere of invasion and preparedness continued to hold sway in the public consciousness leading to the continued growth of the volunteer militias. As many of them saw themselves as taking on an active combat role in any invasion, the army became concerned they would become at best, a hindrance in battle or worse a danger to themselves and soldiers. Growing calls in the government pushed to have the groups clamped down upon in some form but the government was unwilling to take any real action against them for fear of a public relations disaster and backlash amongst militant political representatives. With it becoming increasingly unpopular to simply ignore calls to arm the populace, it was agreed that an officially-sponsored home defence force would allow the government greater control over the growing militia forces while keeping the public satisfied with defence efforts. On May 1st of 1927, the Home Guard was formed though during its early years it proved to be ineffective and was plagued by constant administrative and logistical issues. While it was "mobilised" throughout the Twilight War period, commentators have doubted that it had any significant impact on the course of events owing to the fact the Home Guard was not officially accorded formal combat status or timetabled activities until 1929. Prior to this, Home Guard units simply carried out patrols and "guard duty" without official sanction or regard for orders from the central government. It is uncertain how many, if any, members of the Home Guard died in active service due to the lack of any "official" encounters with the enemy.
Loyalist forces continued to undergo a decline as some members abandoned the group to resume more normal lives and others fled the country to a less dangerous existence abroad. Nevertheless, some minor attacks were carried out on behalf of Loyalist forces such as the firebombing of municipal buildings in small towns and the bombing of commercial vehicles across the country. These rarely caused any casualties, usually minor wounds at worst, but did continue to fuel genuine fears that the Loyalist campaign was alive and well - even if entering a state of dormancy. The wait would not be long, however, for a second "Black Summer" dawned when news of another assassination reached the headlines. On the 19th July, the retired politician - John Davidson - had left the Birmingham General Hospital following a routine appointment and was allegedly to meet with a representative of the Iron Foundry unions. Having left the hospital, he was approached by a man who asked him if he was Davidson. Davidson replied that he was and asked if the man had been sent by the Foundry unions. The man replied "Yes I was," and proceeded to shoot Davidson point-blank in the chest with a sawn-off shotgun, killing him instantly. He attempted to fire again at a passing man who witnessed the killing but was tackled by two off duty police constables who rendered him unconscious and took him into custody. A murder investigation was launched by the NIB, who declared it a terrorist incident.
The public reaction was harsh and a brief period of retaliation followed in which suspected Loyalists in the city were harassed and beaten. Some had their homes burgled and were sacked from their employment without fair tribunal. Local trades councils turned a blind eye to these incidents and rarely intervened. Oswald Mosley, a local politician, commented harshly on the matter, as did others - more is discussed in the Red Terror section. The man in question was anonymously named "Clapton" during proceedings but his name quickly leaked to the press, and he was named as Walter Waller. In the first intervention of its kind, the CIC took over the case from the NIB and Waller was charged with high treason. After some months of imprisonment, Waller eventually agreed to give evidence and he claimed that he had been ordered to assassinate Davidson on the basis that he was an "influential member of the TUC" - this was somewhat outdated as Davidson had left politics the year prior due to his declining health, though he had maintained connections with the Foundry unions. Waller claimed that he had not received orders from a "Bill Negle" nor Hugh Pollard but had worked with and knew a man known as "Fitzpatrick", a Loyalist officer based in the Southwest who had since been reposted to the North. Furthermore, he claimed that "Fitzpatrick" had a "very thick Ulster accent; very posh and well-spoken; very outspoken in his opinions." However, some weeks after he had first confessed, Waller attempted to change his testimony and claimed that Davidson had been supplying them with information. Waller provided no evidence to this claim and later tried to claim that Davidson was secretly a Loyalist rather than simply an informant. Despite his hopes, Waller was not granted a reprieve and was executed in late September.
Only two months later in November, two Loyalist bombings were reported in the Northern industrial city of Leeds, spreading panic among the public. Attacks in urban areas were unusual and two within the space of a few months marked a change of strategy from rural coercion to urban terrorism. Both bombings occurred on the 9th November within half an hour of each other, the first occurring at approximately 7:45 PM in the Leeds City Hall. A bomb had been planted in a stairwell in the back of the building, presumably at some point in the day, and wounded three people though none were killed. Significant structural damage was done to the building and the fire brigade had to put out a blaze that formed out of the bombed out ruins. Elsewhere on Park Row, a second bombing occurred on Park Row at approximately 8:20 PM where a crowd had been gathering to participate in an exhibition at the Leeds City Museum. Six people were killed and at least thirty more injured though most damage was done to the building's foyer and façade which was largely destroyed in the blast. The CIC took direct control of the operation but despite the combined efforts of the police and NIB to keep calm in the city, a similar event as had occurred in Birmingham unfolded where-in suspected Loyalists were beaten and harassed. "Black Wednesday" as it became known, was touted for its violence but no significant outbursts occurred in the days after due to police suppression of angered demonstrators. Only one of the bombers was found but he refuse to turn evidence against his comrades. He was executed by hanging in the New Year.
Loyalist activity plateaued in early 1928 and was once again reduced to more small-scale attacks and even a return of "rural requisitions" as they were called. But these were limited and not at all the norm. Much political attention was placed on Scotland - now undergoing its own political and sectarian violence - leaving time for the Loyalists to once again consolidate after their recent attacks. Fears grew that Loyalists would exploit the political divisions to advance their agenda though CIC observers felt this was not feasible as Loyalist operations in Scotland were largely consigned to a rump military faction based out of the Highlands rather than areas of actual campaigning. Fears did abound that Loyalists would attempt to infiltrate the nascent Unionist Council but this was put to rest when John Craik-Henderson and his followers - remnants of the old Unionist Party - were banned from participating. Craik-Henderson was later arrested for seditious libel in the Summer of 1928 though later released. Loyalist activity in 1928 was another period of calm in which operations were focused once again on internal consolidation and gaining access to secured supply lines. British exiles based in Europe had now undertaken serious attempts at organisation meaning a second stream of funding had been opened.
However, the quiet would not last forever and in the later summer, another terrorist bombing was attempted. On the 18th of August, a sleeper train carrying regular fare passengers and the VIP, Scottish politician Tom Bell, was bombed as it passed through the commuter town of Newcraighall, near Edinburgh. The Newcraighall Bombing sparked an immediate public outcry and left dozens dead. Among the deceased was the intended target of the attack, Bell. A TUC member, Bell was influential Scottish politician who had yet to take a stance in the referendum but had sought to ease the sectarian tensions. Initially, no group came forward to claim the attack but it was well suspected that the Loyalists had carried out. Nevertheless, the Scottish independence activist R.B Cunninghame Graham claimed this would be common occurrence in Scotland should it not receive its independence and he was jailed for his troubles. A manhunt was started and after successive investigations, the CIC were able to arrest two of the bombers in December though the bomb-maker and the group's leader were never captured. Only one of the bombers arrested was identified to the public, referred to as Charles Hoke. He went on to testify in trial that he had been supervised by "Reginald Kelleth", an ex-Royal Marine and the third man. He also identified the bomb-maker as an ex-mechanic simply known as "Ryway" but claimed to have never met him. Hoke also identified "Bill Negle" and "Fitzpatrick" as Gilbert William Nagle and Noel Fitzpatrick - née Skeffington-Smyth - two officers who had commanded the little-known "King's Volunteers" international regiment during the Civil War and had since become commanders in the Loyalist resistance. Arrest warrants were put out for both men though no information was forthcoming. Hoke also gave further evidence in exchange for a commuting of the death penalty in which he testified that pilots sympathetic to the Loyalists had flown "supply runs" out of Northern Ireland under the guise of being hobbyist aviationists and commercial pilots to smuggle in illicit funds and supplies. He named two of these pilots as Captain Robert Henry McIntosh and his junior, a Rupert Belville. The RAF was placed on high alert but was never able to intercept the flights casting some doubt on Hoke's testimony.
The Long War[]
Following 1928, Loyalist terror once again plateaued and moved away from attacking overtly civilian targets or carrying out forced requisitions of supplies. According to the intelligence services, the remaining Loyalist forces turned more towards either integrating within the civilian populace to prepare a potential fifth column among discontented citizens and rebuilding covert paramilitary bases.
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The Red Terror[]
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Outcome[]
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