Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann Hollweg (27 November 1856 - 1 January 1921) was a German non-partisan liberal-conservative politician, Reichskanzler & Prussian Minister-President between 1909 & 1917, and one of the most influential statesmen of his time. A long-time proponent of compromising with the other great powers during the early 1910s, most prominently Britain, and, during the war, efforts to establish a fair peace with the Allied Powers as well as introducing progressive reforms to the outdated Prussian three-class franchise, Bethmann eventually lost the support of both the Reichstag and the military, leading to his disgraced downfall in July 1917 & his replacement with the almost unknown civil servant Georg Michaelis.
Until this day, Bethmann remains a divisive figure in German history. Conservatives and nationalists claim that his soft foreign policy for the sake of appeasing the United States of America and preventing them from joining the war on the Allied side, manifested most prominently in his vehement opposition towards unrestricted submarine warfare, unnecessarily prolonged the war and internally weakened Germany, eventually leading to the failed 1918 September Insurrections. Left-leaning politicians argue that Bethmann was merely a reactionary in disguise of a progressive who only pushed for a compromise peace & supported internal reforms to save the Empire from total collapse in times of hardship. Nonetheless, although Bethman is rarely recognised for this, his legacy as a spiritual precursor and pioneer of the eventual Brockdorffian 1920 March Reforms is remarkable.
Biography[]
Early Life[]
Theodor von Bethmann Hollweg was born in Hohenfinow, Brandenburg, the son of Prussian public official Felix von Bethmann Hollweg. His grandfather was August von Bethmann Hollweg, who had been a prominent law scholar, president of Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin, and Prussian Minister of Culture.
After a strict upbringing but excellent education at the Landesschule Pforta, Bethmann studied law at the universities of Straßburg, Leipzig and Berlin. He would enter the Prussian administrative service in 1882, soon rising through the ranks as a competent but inconspicuous assessor and later on district administrator. By 1899, he was appointed President of the Province of Brandenburg, one of the most important and high-ranking administrative positions in Prussia.
Bethmann's promising career continued in 1905, when he, as successor to the late Hans Freiherr von Hammerstein, became Prussian Minister of the Interior under Reichskanzler and Prussian Minister-President Bernhard von Bülow. He first presented himself to the public in 1906 with a reformist speech on potential alterations to the vastly outdated Prussian three-class franchise; even though not much changed except a few outdated provisions of the 1849 electoral law, it would give Bethmann the reputation of a progressive reformer - something that would haunt him a decade later during the hardships of the Weltkrieg.
Secretary of State for the Interior and Vice Chancellor[]
Reichskanzler Bülow soon took notice of Bethmann and was impressed of him: A man with an impeccable conservative basic attitude but also with an open eye for democratic necessities in political and social life was exactly the man he needed for his liberal-conservative government, because just recently, Count Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner, German State Secretary of the Interior, had been forced to resign due to disagreements over the Empire's colonial policy. Thus, in June 1907, Bethmann became his succesor, not only as State Secretary of the Interior, but also as German Vice Chancellor. However, even though he was now in a political key position, Bethmann was not able to push through his reformist agenda as he had hoped to do. The governing conservative-liberal coalition in the Reichstag was crumbling and already close to collapse, and in the Prussian parliament, the powerful conservatives blocked any attempt of reform. Still, Bethmann tried to assisst Bülow as best as he could, defending him against the Kaiser's personal regiment during the Daily Telegraph Affair of 1908 in the Ministry of State and in the Bundesrat, and shortly after, it was Bethmann who was able to sway the Bundesrat to agree to a controversial financial reform - which however also caused the governing coalition to collapse, leading to Bülow's fall in July 1909.
German Reichskanzler[]
After the disgraced fall of Bülow, the choice for his successor soon fell on Vice Chancellor Bethmann. Many hoped that he would be the right man to finally tackle all the pressing internal issues of the Empire, but especially the conservatives of the Empire met Bethmann with reluctance. They feared that Bethmann would be too "soft" and not able to properly represent Germany with a firm hand on the global stage like Bülow had done it. They were not too wrong: Bethmann always had been more atttracted to the fine arts, to music and to philosophy, was generally known as pessimistic, melancholic and introverted and impressed people with his broad knowledge and administrative skills, but not with diplomatic finesse or a martial appearance. From the beginning, he realised that the position of Reichskanzler might be a step too far for him - but he remained in office due to his typical Prussian sense of of duty to the state.
Domestic Policy[]
On a domestic level, Bethmann was able to give some new impetus, for example by putting Bülow's German settlement efforts in Posen to an effective halt or introducing a modern constitution for Alsace-Lorraine, but major changes failed to materialize. A proposed suffrage reform in Prussia failed spectecularly due to the conservatives in 1910 and minor social reforms were not able to appease the working class as hoped. Even worse, the Reichstag elections of 1912 provided evidence that the internal German conditions were sick and that the system was flawed from within: Over a third of the German population had voted for the SPD, which gave them so many seats in the Reichstag that the conservatives began struggling to block any kind of reform as usual. Only the Kingdom of Prussia remained a fortress for the conservatives - almost everywhere else, the social democrats were expanding their influence; in many federal states, they had already long integrated into the local governance, especially in Southern Germany.
On 4 December 1913, he received the first political vote of no confidence in the history of the Empire on the occasion of the Zabern Affair. Even worse, another vote of no confidence followed in January 1914, this time by the Prussian House of Lords who accused him of not governing "Prussian" enough. His personal reputation and that of his government were at a low point at the time, even though he survived both votes. But Bethmann knew that reforms had to be introduced: A radical reorganisation of the Bismarckian Constitution, a proper integration of Prussia into the politics of the Empire, ways to satisfy the broader masses politically by giving them a real share in government and giving them equal economic and social rights and thus alleviating the tensions and bridging the gaps. Democracy, so thought Bethmann, was inevitable, and therefore, he tried to take every measure possible to push forward modernization.
Foreign Policy[]
In regard to the German foreign policy, a topic Bethmann had barely any experience, he at least realised that Germany was in a precarious situation. Since the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck in 1890, Germany had slowly began to isolate itself on the global stage, mainly due to the erratic and uncompromising foreign policy Wilhelm II and especially Bülow had pursued for several decades. The Entente had been formed as a firm alliance between France, Britain and Russia while Germany was stuck with the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy that grew more and more weary of the Triple Alliance with every day. Germany had no room for foreign political maneuvres anymore like back in the days of Bismarck - a concept known as Einkreisung (Encirclement). Bethmann was aware that Germany somehow had to break out of this encirclement and escape the noose that was slinging around her neck, and this would only be possible via a détente with Britain. For that however, the Anglo-German naval arms race had to put to a halt; something that turned out to be more difficult than initially expected.
Due to his inexperience in foreign affairs, Bethmann relied heavily on his State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter, without a doubt one of the Empire's most skilled diplomats. However, his attempt to rip the Entente apart during the Second Moroccan Crisis while simultaneously securing a large colonial empire in Central Africa in return for recognizing French sovereignty over Morocco, ended in one of Germany's most humiliating foreign political defeats of all time and only strengthened the Anglo-French ties. At the same time, relations with the Russians were strained due to the German-Ottoman cooperation thanks to the construction of the Baghdad Railway as well as the dispatch of a German military mission under Otto Liman von Sanders to Constantinople. Reconciliation efforts with Britain failed spectacularly because of the interference of the Secretary of State for the Navy Alfred von Tirpitz and the Kaiser himself; the naval arms race continued. Nonetheless, Bethmann was able to improve relations with Britain to some extent when he worked with British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey to alleviate tensions during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. Additionally, he managed to negotiate treaties with Britain over an eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies - but when war broke out in mid-1914, Bethmann's foreign policy collapsed like a house of cards.
The Weltkrieg[]
During the July Crisis, Bethmann assured the Austro-Hungarians Germany's unconditional support, regardless of Austria's actions against Serbia; his sudden consequential behaviour surprised even his most ardent critics. Nonetheless, when tensions boiled over and France and Russia declared war on Germany, he was shocked, unlike many of his German contemporaries who were enthusiastically looking forward towards the war as part of the Augusterlebnis - from the very beginning, he was completely without faith that Germany would ever be able to win this conflict, especially when Britain joined the war after the German invasion of Belgium. He reportedly asked the departing British Ambassador Edward Goschen how Britain could go to war over a "scrap of paper" ("ein Fetzen Papier"), which was the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality - his words had a lasting effect and would give the Allies a powerful propaganda weapon in their struggle against Germany.
Bethmann was also the one who could convince Wilhelm II of the Burgfrieden concept, leading to the latter's famous proclamation "I no longer know any parties, I only know Germans" in front of the German people. Bethmann also urged the Ministry of State to make the greatest possible concessions to the Social Democrats as a pledge of internal unity; he was convinced that the war could only be won if the SPD did not enter into the opposition and the entire German people remained united against the enemy. In regard to German war aims, Bethmann was undetermined. Due to his low faith in the war effort, he had from the very beginning a compromise peace with the Allies in mind: Finish the war as quick as possible and then finally restore peace in Europe, in the best case once and for all. Nonetheless, to appease especially the German industrial elite, he presented the Septemberprogramm shortly after the begin of the war, a set of war goals especially on the topic of potential territorial annexations in the west.
His foreign policy managed to win the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria as allies, but he could not prevent that almost every European country eventually declared war against the empire, nor did he know how to create promising possibilities for a fair peace offer. Plans to destabilise Britain's and France's colonies, most notably the Hindu–German Conspiracy, remained fruitless, and so did efforts do conclude a separate peace with Russia and Japan. Russia had been enraged when Germany came forward with the proclamation of an independent Congress Poland in late 1916 under the pressure of the military that wanted to conscript Polish soldiers into the German army, and Japan was not willing to betray her European Allies for a few minor concessions in the Pacific.
The "Chancellor of Peace"[]
However, Bethmann had one ace up his sleeve that would, at least he hoped so, potentially enable him to conclude a fair and honorable peace with the Allies: His good relations to President Woodrow Wilson of the neutral United States of America. These, however, were almost completely shattered multiple times due to the German navy's and high command's various attempts to launch unrestricted submarine warfare (USMW), which led to the death of over 100 American citizens during the sinking of the RMS Lusitania and the SS Arabic. Only following the Sussex Pledge of early 1916, the unrestricted submarine campaign was shut down for good, being replaced later that year with the start of "intensified submarine warfare", which was entirely in accordance with the international prize laws and therefore accepted by the US.
Nevertheless, German far-right circles, spearheaded by Alfred von Tirpitz, were not content with this decision; they thought that only unrestricted submarine warfare would be able to push Britain out of the war. Over the following months, they created a pro-USMW "deep state" within the Empire, consisting of influential aristocrats, the civil service, the industry, the Ober Ost military administration and the Supreme Army Command (OHL), the German Colonial Society, Pan-German League & Navy League, conservative and national-liberal media and even the wife, children & close friends of the Kaiser. Together, they rallied funds the biggest propaganda campaign in German history against the "soft" Reichskanzler and his "internationalist goals". But Bethmann had the luck that he enjoyed the unconditional support of Wilhelm II and was backed by a majority within the Reichstag - therefore, he was not dismissed as many had hoped for.
Instead, he doubled down on his efforts to present himself as the "Great German Negotiator" or the "Chancellor of Peace". While had had been quite dependent on the Supreme Army Command under Erich von Falkenhayn since the begin of the war, he now capitalized on the latter's mistakes during the Battle of Verdun and the Brusilov Offensive and was part of the conspiracy that would lead to the ousting of Falkenhayn in the autumn of 1916, after Romania's surprising entry into the war. Coincidently, Falkenhayn had always been one of the most ardent supporters of USMW - he was replaced by the duo of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, who Bethmann deemed as more loyal to the government's foreign political course; a few months later he would realise that this was a more than grave misconception.
In December 1916, thanks to the mediation of Wilson, Bethmann finally pushed forward and sent an official peace offer to the Allies, despite resistance from the military. Tied to that offer was the goal to win the backing of the neutrals, stoke pacifist sentiment in the Allied countries, and boost morale at home. However, the Allies would reject the offer without any second thought, especially the more than determined British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and the war continued. Even worse, Wilson, who always had had at least subliminal sympathies for the Entente's cause, mainly due to America's close economic ties to Britain and France, was not willing to go a step further and impose sanctions on the Allies as a retaliatory measure for their decision, only half-heartedly calling for "Peace without Victory". This major diplomatic failure can be considered the beginning of the end of Bethmann's career - while he was able to prevent the relaunch of USMW shortly after at a conference at Pless Castle due to the backing of Chief of the Admiralty Staff Henning von Holtzendorff, he would entirely lose the support of the military over his decision and indirectly caused a further radicalisation of the far-right, who continued their propaganda war against the chancellor.
The "Chancellor of Reform"[]
The longer the war dragged on, the harder it turned out for Bethmann to preserve or consolidate the internal unity of the Burgfriedenpolitik, mostly because of his relatively uncharismatic and undecided appearance. Nonetheless, he remained loyal to his reformist agenda, promising far-reaching constitutional reforms to the German people after the war. Without a complete reorientation, for example a liberal organisation of social and economic life, and without the elimination of the Prussian three-class suffrage system, he feared a revolution. However, his appeasement of the left intensified the hostility of the conservatives towards him even further. The situation deteriorated after the Russian February Revolution, as the German left further radicalized, manifested for example in the split of the SPD into the moderate MSPD and the radical USPD in spring 1917.
To tackle these worrying developments in the German far-left, Bethmann urged the Kaiser to make official concessions to the German people in a public speech: The famous Easter Promise from April 1917. However, the reforms Wilhelm announced were left intentionally vague and did not satisfy the broad population as hoped. Instead, the OHL's distrust of Bethmann only continued to grow, as they feared he would try to undermine the military's power by strengthening the government's competences. At this point, Ludendorff and Hindenburg officially joined the rightist conspiracy against the chancellor: The first step towards the unofficial "Ludendorff Dictatorship".
But also the Reichstag began to slowly lose their faith in Bethmann, mainly due to the looming dispute over the war aims. Bethmann, who always had spoken himself out against large-scale annexations, had been forced to make some concessions to the military at a war aims conference in Bad Kreuznach; this however had harmed his last remaining credibility as a genuine fighter for peace. In front of the Reichstag, influential Catholic politician Matthias Erzberger argued that as a consequence, the parliament, and not the head of government, should take the initiative to issue a peace offer to the Allies: The Reichstag Peace Resolution. Erzberger’s extraordinary speech was celebrated by the Zentrum, SPD and FVP who would soon form a working group within the Reichstag, the Interfraktioneller Ausschuss (IFA). Apart from the peace question, they would also discuss about potential internal democratic reforms, therefore effectively sidelining the Reichskanzler.
Bethmann, in fear of losing the support of the Reichstag, then tried to introduce a reform program and initiate another peace offensive himself as fast as possible. He asked the Kaiser to call a crown council in the Prussian State Ministry to discuss the introduction of the equal franchise in Prussia. There, his ideas were initially met with harsh criticism, with archconservatives already imagining a Prussia “dominated by social democrats and Poles”. The Kaiser's statement on the proposed reforms can be considered a prime example of the predominant feeling in German conservative circles towards the equal franchise in Prussia: “In the one side’s view the introduction of the equal franchise would mean the decline of Prussia, in the view of the other, failure to introduce it would probably mean the loss of the war and thus the decline of both Germany AND Prussia.“
In the end, however, Bethmann's reform plan was, to the surprise of many, accepted by the Prussians. On the afternoon of 11 July 1917, the ministry met again and the chancellor presented the draft of an “All Highest Order regarding the Equal Franchise”, which would be signed by the Kaiser the same evening - equal franchise for Prussia had been finally accepted in principle, although not yet enshrined in legal form.
Downfall and Last Years[]
However, as soon as news of this appeared in German newspapers, the military and the far-right struck their last blow against the struggling chancellor; in dictatorial imperiousness and with the consistent intention of "militarizing the entire life of the state" in the sense of total war, they strove to make the post of Reichskanzler the executive organ of military decisions. Only a day later, Ludendorff and Hindenburg threatened the Kaiser with their resignation in case Bethmann would not be dismissed. The duo was backed by parts of the Reichstag and even the Crown Prince himself - the agitation against him took on new, unprecedented forms.
In this so-called "July Crisis of 1917", Bethmann eventually fell victim to many of his most bitter opponents, but also to his erstwhile supporters, the majority parties in the Reichstag, for whose goals he had just stood up in the Prussian State Ministry. In the end, he had not appeared determined enough, and the left always had thought of him as a conservative in disguise with no genuine intention to reform the crumbling Empire from ground-up. He had lost his authority altogether, was not able to find support anywhere and eventually got caught between the fronts. On 13th July, Bethmann decided to resign. Wilhelm II supposedly reacted to that with the following sentence: "And I am to dismiss the man who towers over everyone by the length of one head?"
By bowing to the OHL's demands, Wilhelm II effectively surrendered his monarchical decision-making power, which more or less turned him into a puppet of Ludendorff - the "Shadow Kaiser". As there was no proper successor available, the almost unknown Prussian government official Georg Michaelis was chosen, more as an interim solution than anything else. All reform attempts for the Prussian suffrage were put on hold for the time being. After his resignation, Bethmann withdrew to his estate at Hohenfinow to the northeast of Berlin. There, he would write down his memoires in almost total seclusion, in which he attempted to present a justification for his decisions against the many accusations that were brought up against him during his chancellorship. Occasionally, he would organize meetings with his old political companions, among them Wilhelm Solf, Hans Delbrück and Ernst Troeltsch. Bethmann died of acute pneumonia on 1 January 1921, only aged 64.
Legacy[]
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg failed as wartime chancellor in the face of grave realities. He did not achieve his far-reaching goals of establishing both peace and a reformed state for the German people under a Volkskaisertum. In the fight for Germany's survival against a hostile and terrible fate, he tried to include justice and morality into his policies as best as he could - but different to many other politicians of his time, the emphasis on bringing ethics into domestic and international politics was not just empty words to him.
Bethmann Hollweg's political legacy lives on in the March Reforms, however, despite a lack of recognition of this circumstance and praise for his deeds. Many government officials who are usually credited for the reform program started their career under Bethmann and thus shaped it according to ideals proposed and supported by him during his tenure. To this day, Bethmann continues to play a prominent role in right-wing, anti-parliamentarian rhetoric. The late Alfred von Tirpitz, spiritual father of the German Fatherland Party (DVLP), regularly referred to the post-1920 political system as the deluded "System Bethmann-Brockdorff", which he described as the beginning of the end of Germany's greatness. In his spirit, the national revolutionary DVLP leadership around Ulrich von Hassell uses the same rhetoric to describe the post-March Constitution order as a cancer that must be removed from the German national body and replaced by an organic, viable alternative in accordance with Germany's ancient roots.