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The 1922 Miners Strike, also known as the 1922 Coal Strike, the 1922 General Strike and the Forgotten Strike, was a major industrial action in the United Kingdom. The strike began within the Yorkshire coal mining industry, initially in protest against an enquiry into a mining disaster at the Wharncliffe Woodmoor Colliery in Barnsley in South Yorkshire. The inquiry ruled in favour of the mine owners, clearing of them wrongdoing, and causing uproar among local miners who accused the inquiry of covering up the incident. While strike action was initially constrained only to the Yorkshire coal fields, they quickly spread to the rest of the country and a nationwide strike was declared in midsummer. A brutal showdown with the government followed in which a state of emergency was declared, the military was deployed to striking areas and nationwide lockouts plagued the industry. Following a request for support from the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), the TUC General Council pledged its assistance and after extensive negotiations, a week of collective strike action primarily by transport and railway workers with some other industries occurred in the Autumn, known as Red Friday and the Week of Discontent. The strike came to an end at the start of the winter period when the government offered to establish a commission into the safety of the mines and investigate what improvements could be made though it refused to engage in matters of pay. The MFGB reluctantly accepted the decision and called off the strikes after 5 months of action.
While the exact details of the outcome is disputed, the strike is remembered for being the first significant strike victory for the miners in the aftermath of the Great War and for helping rebuild trade union unity - via way of the TUC's General Council - following the disastrous events of Black Friday, the prior year. The betrayal of the miners by the railwaymen and transport workers had severely hampered relations between the three unions and permanently destroyed the Triple Alliance between them. In retaliation for the bungling of the affair, the moderate leadership of the miners and transport unions were replaced by more militant figures, namely A.J. Cook of the miners and Ben Tillett of the transport workers. Cook was fiercely determined to settle old scores with the government and - as a former syndicalist - more committed to working with the wider Trades Union Congress. Tillett, was a veteran trade unionist widely known for his involvement in the creation of the "New Unionism" of the late 19th Century alongside his often-friend, occasional-enemy, Tom Mann. Hawkish and demagogic, Tillett was quick to back the miners and pledge the might of the newly-formed Transport & General Workers Union, the largest trade union in the world, to their assistance, triggering a bitter disaffiliation dispute with the National Transport Workers Federation. Under pressure from the rank-and-file (and sensing that the miners were much better organised this time), the Railwaymen's executive also opted for strike action, as did sections of other unions within the TUC. Cook later commented that it was the General Council and its more effective machinery that 'won the day'.
Despite the importance of the significance of the event, the Miners Strike of 1922 has often been overshadowed by its far more prominent successor two years later, the General Strike of 1924 and the proceeding events of the British Revolution. Nevertheless, it has been regarded by modern historians as a necessary first step into rebuilding trade union unity in preparation for the future revolution after the fallout of Black Friday. While the miners were not able to achieve all their primary goals of forcing a new inquiry to the Wharncliffe Woodmoor Disaster and forcing the government to re-establish wartime wage rates for the mines at a national level, the events of 'Red Friday' - when the government officially conceded defeat - were considered a monumental victory. Per the agreement to end the strike, the government formed the Kenyon Commission into the safety of the mines though the Conservative government did not take its defeat lying down. Attempting to undercut the unions, Bonar Law called a snap election, scheduled in the New Year but the election led to a hung parliament, resulting in the establishment of the first Labour government, under Ramsay MacDonald. In consequence Bonar Law would end his political career and die less than a year later.
Black Friday[]
Coal Mining & the Unions[]
Despite hopes of a post-war boom, following the end of the Great War, the British economy entered a period of recession known as the Great Slump wherein wages fell and unemployment rose. Political unrest became widespread amid the fall in living standards and Britain's trade unions became increasingly militant, particularly those representing the mining industry. One of Britain's largest industries, coal mining had been unionised since the mid-1800s and been involved in multiple skirmishes with the authorities and mine owners, leading to three miners' strikes from the 1890s until the beginning of the Great War. After a period of intense industrial unrest beginning in July 1910, the Miners Federation of Great Britain, the newly-unified National Union of Railwaymen and the National Transport Workers' Federation formalised the "Triple Alliance" in 1914. With the goal of bringing together three of the largest trade unions in their disputes, it marked a significant step towards greater unity and marked the solidification of syndicalist ideology within British trade unionism. The Triple Alliance was not an official body but rather an informal coalition of the three trade unions, independent of the Trades Union Congress, the national trade union centre. The Triple Alliance was planning a general strike, the first of its kind, for the October of 1914 but this was only narrowly avoided by the onset of the Great War, in which the trade unions largely ceased their activity as part of an agreement with the government to not hamper the war effort.
In the aftermath of the war, wages fell as the economy slumped with the coal industry being one of the hardest hit due to a decline in international exports and the emergence of new competitors. Coal was an increasingly sick industry as imports undercut domestic production and exports slumped as market forces shifted - wartime wages were only maintained via increasingly costly government subsidies. Following a victory for the Conservative Party in the general election, the new government under Bonar Law announced it would seek to privatise those industries that had been nationalised during the war, making further wage cuts an inevitably as the necessity of cost-cutting - and longer hours to float production - became increasingly apparent. The railways were the first industry to be privatised but successful strike action by the NUR in 1920 over the issue of rates of pay saw the government agree to all the railwaymen's demands and even provided concessions beyond what the railwaymen had desired. The miners went on strike themselves, partially in solidarity and partially to secure concessions of their own, though this strike was called off shortly after it began. Despite the continued support for the railways, the government insisted it would press on with de-control of the coal industry, scheduled to take place when government contracts would expire the following year, on July 31st. Mine owners had already warned that without a government subsidy wage cuts would be necessary to maintain pre-war profits and keep the collieries open. Industry reorganisation - as prescribed the Sankey Commission - was still partially underway; the Coal Commission's bureaucracy was not entirely assembled and where it was in place, it had proven ineffective. Prices on the market for coal did not keep up with the Commission's estimates and it announced that it would be forced to lower the rate it would purchase coal at, in line with general austerity measures pursued by the Conservative government. When this reached the news, the mine owners announced they would have no choice but to introduce wage cuts to make the mines profitable and that industrial reorganisation had "clearly failed". The miners - already dissatisfied with the compromise - reacted with hostility and threatened with the possibility of new strike action. To avert further pain for the industry, the government urged both sides to reach a new settlement.
Failed Negotiations[]
Frank Hodges
Negotiations between mine owners and trade union branches, under the supervision of the MFGB executive, were undertaken in the run-up to the anticipated date of privatisation. Rather than ease tensions, an already inflamed situation was worsened when talks repeatedly ended in deadlock and it became increasingly apparent that any new agreement the owners offered would end the existing system of national agreements. As implemented in war-time, all pits would adopt the same rates of pay irregardless of external factors though this was deemed impossible to maintain, by the mine owners. Instead it became clear that in lieu of a national agreement, the mines would return to the old system of district rates. Hated by mine workers, this functioned on the basis that coal districts all maintained separate rates and so mines within certain areas would have major pay imbalances. The miners refused to abandon the sanctity of national agreements; the owners argued that pits in the less profitable regions could not afford the existing, war-time wage rates. To resolve this problem, the MFGB leadership proposed the 'national pool', which would aim to fix a levy on every ton of coal raised and so assist the poorest collieries by providing a national fund on which they could draw to cover any losses and meet wage bills. The proposal was first discussed at a conference in London between the MFGB, the Government and the Mining Association, in the middle of March as a final attempt to avoid strike action. General-Secretary of the MFGB, Frank Hodges declared that, "If it really is impossible for the coal mine owners to pay a living wage, as they themselves claim, then the only alternative we see is to accept a national pool." though it was not necessarily a consensus even among the miners. Herbert Smith, Vice-President of the MFGB (and President the powerful Yorkshire Miners Association) led the opposition to the proposal, arguing it was too abstract and vague with little assurances on its success. Nevertheless, Smith was compelled to support it for the sake of avoiding colliery closures, at the encouragement of MFGB President, Robert Smilie.
Despite hope from the government that an agreement could be reached, the Mining Association blocked the proposals and deadlocked the conference. Evan Williams, President of the Mining Association of Great Britain, mooted that nationalisation was not necessarily an impossible option and a potential alternative exit to the quandary, but only if the mine owners were provided with sufficiently expensive compensation. William Bridgeman, Secretary for the Mines, ruled out such a proposal as "exorbitantly and unacceptably expensive", a motion seconded by Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain. To further complicate matters, Chamberlain voiced his support for the national pool though this was again rejected by the mine owners as stifling competition and unworkable. With the reintroduced possibility of nationalisation of the mines with acceptable compensation blocked by the government, and the mine owners refusing to entertain the possibility of the MFGB's national pool, the conference was formally closed without reaching any conclusion. It appeared that wage cuts were imminent and in the run up to March 31st, mine owners warned their workers not to participate in trade union activities relating to the incoming wage cuts or face retaliatory lockouts. No further negotiations were attempted and it seemed set that strike action was ready to go ahead. Unrest in the coal fields and colliery towns started to rapidly spiral as workers readied themselves for another fight while the MFGB Executive convened for emergency discussions on how to proceed. Like at the London conference, no satisfactory answers were forthcoming.
With neither side conceding and the negotiations ending in failure, government control of the industry expired on March 31st with no agreement in place. On April 1st, the following day, a nation-wide lockout was declared across the mining industry. After discussions within trade union circles, a week later on the 8th, the Triple Alliance announced its intentions to call for a national rail and transport strike in support of the miners, to formally begin on April 15th. It was expected that more than 2 million men would take part and down tools for the strike, leading to the beginning of preparations on both sides. Elements of the press - both in support and against the miners - declared that the long-awaited general strike was now imminent and reported incidents of concerned citizens stockpiling food and fuel. In retaliation, the Conservative government declared a state of emergency per the Emergency Act 1920 - its first ever use. The Coal Commission was ordered to begin the rationing of its reserves and prepare for long-term stockpiling. Eighty-thousand special constables were called up to reinforce the police and the military was deployed to colliery areas; the ominous sight of machine-gun nests at pitheads became common to the most radical areas. Preparations from the miners themselves were less pro-active and notoriously disorganized. The TUC was able to initially raise £85,000 as part of a fund to assist the locked out miners with a further £25,000 worth of food parcels donated to the TUC's miners assistance fund though little other preparations were undertaken by the MFGB itself.
Left - J. Thomas Right - E. Bevin
In the lead up to the strike, the mood among the trade unionists was increasingly dour. The ongoing slump in the economy and growing unemployment led to a cautious attitude among trade unionists in other industries and increasingly worried prospects among the MFGB executive. A post-war boom had never materialised, and the unemployment rate had nearly reached two million, leaving more prospects for a national strike in an increasingly sick industry. Furthermore, the solidarity of the Triple Alliance was proving more to be platitude than genuine. Leader of the National Union of Railwaymen, Jimmy Thomas, was a shrewd judge of the situation and increasingly wary of a national strike at a time of economic decline, while intimately aware that the railwaymen were far from united or able to muster the requisite strength to carry the strike through. Thomas was joined in misgivings by Ernest Bevin, leader of of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union, a constituent of the National Transport Workers' Federation. Bevin was a promising trade unionist and effective labour leader, known for his successful advocacy of the London dockers; and while he was an enthusiastic supporter of the Alliance (more-so than Thomas at any rate) he shared similar concerns of a strike amid a time of great unemployment, and was pessimistic of the transport workers own strength. Moreover, the mood among the rank-and-file was becoming increasingly resentful at constantly having to support the miners. Thomas noted that the mines could be picketed indefinitely, a task impossible to conduct for dockyards, goods depots and tracks of railway. He remarked: "The mines are blackleg proof. The railways are not." In return, Hodges, recalled that Thomas had declared that he had once led a rail strike which had lasted a 'whole eleven days' and "said it as though it were some wonderful and unique experience. It was - for him. But for us, the strike or lock-out - three months or six - is no exceptional thing." Despite his commitment to the strike, Hodges himself was increasingly concerned about its viability, particularly as the intransigent Miners' Executive had created friction with the other Triple Alliance members. With Smilie suffering from increasingly poor health, Smith deputised and he refused to allow other unions to participate in the planning of the strike prior to it actually taking place, instead simply encouraging them to trust the miners' leadership on the matter.
Within the government, attempts were still being made to find a compromise before the looming strike could begin, now less than a week away. The Cabinet met on April 12th, in the absence of the Prime Minister who was ‘almost entirely occupied with negotiations with regard to the industrial crisis’. Deputizing for Bonar Law, the Lord Privy Seal, The Marquess of Salisbury, told the Cabinet he had seen the Prime Minister, who reported that he had met "Mr Hodges, whose attitude indicated extremist leanings, and who was forcing to the front the question of the national pool." Salisbury said that while a national pool of profits with uniform wages in all districts was quite out of the question, a national settlement with wages varying in different districts could not be excluded. In a memorandum to the Cabinet, Bonar Law reported he agreed wholeheartedly, and a document had been prepared arguing that while a compulsory pool was impossible ‘without the resumption of complete and permanent control by the State of the Mining Industry’ - itself out of the question - a voluntary pool would inevitably break down. In any case, the document continued, pooling would result in inefficient and uneconomical working of the industry. National negotiations, it concluded, combined with varying district rates of wages was the only practicable method of dealing with the present state of the industry. In consequence, when the Triple Alliance reassembled the following day, it was faced with a complete breakdown of the negotiations negotiations. Hodges - chief architect of the pool proposal - still argued it was a viable exit to the ongoing difficulties and was backed by the miners, who still demanded a national wage settlement and the pooling of a proportion of the surplus as an indispensable condition of such a settlement. In retaliation, the Prime Minister publicly denounced the national pool as an attempt by the miners to use industrial action to secure a political end: the nationalization of the mining industry. With the negotiations stalling, the Triple Alliance re-issued the call to strike for April 15th.
Breakdown at Unity House[]
With all negotiations failed, the incoming severity of the strike became all the more apparent and panic gripped the Cabinet. The Territorial Army was despatched to reinforce those military units that had already garrisoned colliery towns and pit villages with additional units prepared to take over dockyards, rail depots and goods yards. Emergency plans to draw up a volunteer defence force to supplement the police and provide temporary strikebreakers was also distributed and recruitment was prepared to begin in conjunction with the strike. Nevertheless, public opinion was gradually swinging behind the miners, as the abortive negotiations made public the extent of the wage cuts. Even within the government it was a growing concern that the drastic drop in wages was too extreme, even if necessary, with the President of the Board of Trade, Arthur Steel-Maitland, warning the Cabinet that: "A drop from 80s. to 44s. is a bit thick, they've got no hope that their case is going to be examined." The sentiment was agreed on by Chamberlain, who still felt that the national pool held merit but was overridden by the Cabinet at large. Yet the Minister of Labour, Robert Horne, was more optimistic and still felt some kind of settlement could be achieved. Well aware of the doubts and divisions on the union side and he commented to the Cabinet:
| “ | I don’t think J. H. Thomas knows where he is, or he would have been along to see me. He wants no revolution. He wants to be Prime Minister. He does not want to be a commissary for Bevin. Thomas is all for peace and he does not want a row to please Hodges. I have complete confidence that Thomas selfishness will soon pull through. | ” |
Horne's assessment would ultimately prove remarkably accurate but with the strike now only some days away, the imminent threat stimulated would-be mediators to try to bring the two sides together again. A crossbench group of Liberal and Unionist M.P.s, led by Dr. Thomas Macnamara, feared the House had played too small a part in trying to resolve the crisis and invited owners and miners to argue their case before them. On Thursday, April 14th, two meetings took place at the Commons between the two groups and the informal committee, with all news being reported directly to the Prime Minister. In the afternoon Evan Williams, of the MAGB, put the owners’ case, but his reportedly 'over-bearing manner' and insistence on immediate wage cuts amounting to nearly half of the current pay, left many members dissatisfied and unsympathetic. In the evening, however, Frank Hodges put the miners’ case and was said to have created a much more favourable impression. Hodges stressed the demand for a national settlement backed by his national pool proposal and a form of temporary subsidiary from the Government to assist in the transitionary period from district wages, to a national wage. However, a crisis emerged when, in reply to a question (which Hodges felt he had been 'carefully prepared for') he officially declared that the miners were prepared to consider a temporary settlement of wages quite apart from the question of the national pool. This answer was in flat contradiction to the policy of the MFGB; but none of the members of the miners’ executive present dissented. Hodges believed he was helping the Triple Alliance to more easily support the miners on the basis that they had long been wary of the national pool. By simplifying the conflict to a 'simple dispute' over wages, Hodges felt it was made easier for the railway and transport rank-and-file to back the miners on more familiar terms. But his answer had the reverse effect. The Unionist MPs among the delegation felt they had made a breakthrough, and reportedly rushed to 10 Downing Street to inform the Prime Minister.
Unity House
As the delegations questioning of Hodges had only ended at midnight, it was decided to let the Prime Minister rest and instead, Austen Chamberlain was awoken to be informed of the news. Chamberlain was reportedly in 'pyjamas and a dressing gown, still shaking the sleep from his head' when he was alerted to the development. Nevertheless, Chamberlain deputized for the Prime Minister and dictated a letter to the MFGB executive in which the government offered to re-open negotiations immediately on the basis of a temporary settlement. He invited them to meet representatives of the Government and the mine-owners the following day at 11 AM. The coming morning, at 9 AM - thirteen hours before the strike was due to begin - the railway and transport union executives met at the NUR headquarters in Unity House, London and were said to be 'very pleased' with the news of further negotiations. Jimmy Thomas later commented that it: "was an awfully ironic choice; unity was about to dissolve. Not that the miners could see it coming." The miners' executive was conferring in another room and would join the rest of the Alliance leaders shortly. Initially, the delegations were optimistic as Hodges’ vision the night before still seemed attainable and he informed then that his proposals had gone down 'exceedingly well'; the potential power of the Triple Alliance would be cemented and won another clear victory, as it had done in 1920. However, as the miners were yet again unforthcoming, Ernest Bevin reported the atmosphere turned 'horrendously gloomy'. The miners had failed to meet the Government for the renewed negotiations and at 11:45 AM later the miners’ meeting broke up angrily: Herbert Smith announced his counterparts in the NUR and NTWF that the miners were turning down the Prime Minister’s offer to re-open negotiations and that he was returning to their Russell Square headquarters to draft a reply. When Bevin demanded an explanation to what exactly had happened and what was now planned, Smith reportedly responded: "Get on t’field Ernie. That’s t’place." Still attempting to find an answer, Bevin requested an explanation from the more amicable Hodges who simply informed him that a group of miners at the Bickershaw Colliery in Lancashire had been attacked by special constables sent to protect strikebreakers, leading to some consternation in the miners executive. However, Hodges refused to elaborate further and told Bevin that this was strictly under the purview of the MFGB and as such, any course of action would be decided at Russel Square.
It soon transpired that the miners had in fact repudiated Hodges’s statement of the night before, but only by a majority of one. Unity House was now in the grip of bedlam, with the various executives of the alliance either attempting to ascertain what exactly was expected to take place at 10 PM, the anticipated beginning of the strike. To add to the chaos, Hodges was allegedly 'slumped over a desk weeping' after receiving news that Smith had returned to Russel House to handle affairs without him. Afterwards Jimmy Thomas pursued Smith to Russel Square for an explanation and a demand to speak to Smilie; as always the miners’ leader was past persuading and refused to concede any move towards additional negotiations. The miners themselves were now so deeply divided that there could be no question of a sympathetic strike from their allies in the Triple Alliance and news of violent clashes between miners and the authorities in the runup to the strike was leading to further confusion and consternation. Completely demoralized and now unsure what was expected of them, the railway and transport executives opted to pull out of the strike and called on Cabinet representatives to broker an exit for their unions. Charlie Cramp, Industrial General Secretary of the NUR and de facto deputy to Thomas, met with Robert Horne to inform him the change of circumstances. Horne declared: "Sadly, it is not enough to have a good cause". Cramp replied, "One must have good leaders too", and Horne responded sanctimoniously, "I’m sorry for the miners - they’re a patriotic lot. I’m not heartless enough for this sort of thing". By the afternoon a semblance of calm had returned to Unity House and at 3.30 PM, Thomas met with members of the press on the steps to the entrance and announced with 'cool satisfaction', "It’s all off boys." Thomas was reportedly relieved, as was Robert Williams, the General Secretary of the NWTF. The Triple Alliance was now effectively dead.
Despite both the railwaymen and transport workers pulling out from the strike, the miners were doggedly determined to continue. Hodges was hopeful that the growing violence at the collieries and inertia of the strike would force the government to negotiate again, and in turn force the owners to participate. Smith, however, was hopeful that the rank-and-file of the railway and transport unions would revolt and conduct sympathy strikes, against the orders of their executives. Ultimately, Smith's prediction would prove the closer to reality as some sympathy activity did occur. Under pressure from the members, the NTWF and NUR issued circulars ordering their members not to handle imported coal, though some workers were still unhappy with the limited action and sought to strike. Within Glasgow, the Scottish Union of Dock Labourers broke with the policy of the NTWF executive and called its members to strike in solidarity with the miners, scheduled for the 7th of May. On the 9th, wage reductions were imposed on merchant seaman, triggering a parallel general strike within docks across the country. The miners themselves fought on alone for three months before the MFGB executive called off the strike on the 12th of July. The miners were forced back to work on far worse terms than had been offered before the events of Black Friday the average wage fell from 89s. 8d. a week in the first quarter of 1921 to 58s. 10d. in the fourth - a drop of 34% in nine months.
Death of the Alliance[]
The offending cartoon published in The Syndicalist c. 1921
The events of Black Friday had serious ramifications for British trade unionism and the constituent unions of the Alliance as well as fundamentally altering the trajectory of the British trade union movement. The Triple Alliance was effectively dead when the strike began and was formally wound up in the weeks that followed. Almost immediately, the NUR and NTWF were mired in immense controversy with members of the respective Executives under immense fire for their participation in the 'betrayal'. Jimmy Thomas of the railwaymen became a figure of particular resentment and was pursued at public meetings for some months by hecklers and other detractors. At one such meeting in Bridgwater, a group of hecklers interrupted his speech with shouts of "Jimmy’s selling us!" Thomas returned fire on his would-be tormentors by declaring "I've tried boys, believe me I’ve tried! But I just couldn’t get a buyer." Thomas' troubles would not end there and shortly after the strike began, the Syndicalist Party of Great Britain attacked Thomas with a derisory cartoon (see right) satirising him as the killer of a dead miner and laying claim to lay the first wreath on this basis.
The Wharncliffe Disaster[]
Tensions in Yorkshire[]
WIP WIP